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This paper highlights some of the legal responses to political extremism in the 1930s 
and the modern challenge of international terrorism and extreme right-wing activism. 
In particular, it focuses on restrictions to freedom of expression, the tactics and 
responses employed by the police and the subsequent judgments of the judiciary. 
During the interwar years, the activities of extremist political parties caused major 
disruption to public order. Public meetings, marches and demonstrations organised 
by the British Union of Fascists (BUF), the Communist Party of Great Britain (CPGB) 
and anti-fascist protestors created new challenges for the authorities. Despite fears 
that new legislation would restrict fundamental liberties, the recurrent conflict 
prompted the passing of the Public Order Act 1936. Similarly, today‟s threat to 
national security, posed by international terrorism, has triggered a series of counter-
terrorism measures that have also affected civil liberties and human rights. This 
paper considers how freedom of expression has been restricted in these eras and 
how the official responses to extreme elements in society have also affected citizen‟s 
rights more generally. This comparison will demonstrate that although modern 
repressive measures appear to have been extended since the 1930s, the application 
of the Human Rights Act 1998 and the influence of the European Convention of 
Human Rights (ECHR) inspire the potential to halt this dangerous progression. 
 
Keywords: public order, breach of the peace, fascism, counter terrorism, political 
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Introduction 
In December 1936, during the Commons debate of the Public Order Bill, Independent 
Labour Party MP James Maxton stated, „Sometimes in this House when we attempt 
to evade the evils of dictatorship we are just in danger of imposing upon ourselves all 
the essential evils of dictatorship.‟2 This sentiment was repeated in 2004, when a 
committee of nine Law Lords reviewed the Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act 
2001. Lord Hoffmann declared that, „the real threat to the life of the nation… comes 
not from terrorism but from laws such as these.‟3 These comments made by Maxton 
and Hoffmann, over 70 years apart, reveal the danger of introducing repressive 
legislation in order to protect public security. Striking the appropriate balance 
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between liberty and security was a fundamental aspect of the public order debates of 
the 1930s and is a vital component of the modern debate on counter-terrorism 
legislation. This paper addresses the issue of sacrificing individual liberty in order to 
protect collective security, and assesses the effect of police tactics and legal 
responses on the preservation of public order and human rights. This is achieved by 
comparing and contrasting the inter-war period, and the threat posed by the extreme 
political doctrines of fascism and communism, with the modern threat to security that 
is presented by extreme Islamist factions and modern right wing groups, such as the 
English Defence League (EDL). In both eras, the UK Government, in dealing with the 
threat of violence and disorder, responded by curtailing civil liberties through 
legislative action with the intention of maintaining public safety. More controversially 
though, the extension of breach of the peace powers, that are not authorised by 
statute, have given the police greater discretionary powers which have affected 
liberties related to freedom of expression, such as freedom of assembly and the right 
to protest and demonstrate. This paper will focus on how legislative action and 
Common Law judgments have changed the nature of freedom of expression today. 
 
1 The Challenge of Political Extremism in 1930s Britain  
The political extremism that developed in the UK during the interwar years caused 
serious public disorder, but it is important to note that Parliamentary stability was 
never seriously threatened. Left and right wing extremist groups, most notable 
among them, the British Union of Fascists (BUF) and the Communist Party of Great 
Britain (CPGB), enjoyed relatively little support and membership.4 The BUF was 
founded by former Conservative and Labour MP, Sir Oswald Mosley in 1932 and 
were commonly known as the Blackshirts due to their distinctive uniform.  . Despite 
being a well organised movement with a highly developed political agenda and 
economic policy, the BUF only ever contested three Parliamentary seats. All three of 
the BUF candidates stood in by-elections held in 1940, all of which resulted in a 
forfeited deposit.5 The CPGB was founded in 1920 and was the British arm of the 
Communist International. William Gallacher was a prominent figure in the CPGB and 
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defeated Labour opposition in the 1935 General Election to be elected as MP for 
East Fife. His electoral success followed that of John Newbold and Shapurji 
Saklatvala in the 1920s. The threat posed by these competing movements was the 
frequent violence that became associated with their meetings and demonstrations. 
The typical trend was for communist and anti-fascist factions to disrupt BUF activities 
with organised heckling or protests, which often led to fights between the two groups 
or between the protesters and the police.  
 
The inconsistent use of police action against the political extremists of the left and the 
right ultimately led to accusations of police partiality in favour of the fascists, and is a 
debate that continues amongst historians today. Central to this debate is the use of 
wide discretionary breach of the peace powers and loosely defined legislation. 
Stevenson characterises the Metropolitan Police in this era as „anti-left‟ rather than 
„pro-fascist‟6, while Ewing and Gearty argue more emphatically the case of a partisan 
police force. They counter Stevenson‟s deduction by highlighting that the protestors 
on the receiving end of police militancy would have seen little difference between 
„anti-left‟ or „pro-fascist‟ policing.7 Thurlow‟s argument adds a more moderate 
approach which highlights that while the police at the highest level were not in favour 
of fascism, there were problems of interpreting the law at street level that led to 
inconsistent treatment of fascists and anti-fascists, but he stops short of advocating 
that there was a political motivation for this.8 As will be discussed, police 
inconsistency is caused by loosely defined legislation and the resulting use of wide 
discretionary powers, which is a problem that traverses both eras. If the police were 
politically motivated, this would have undoubtedly had serious consequences on 
freedom of expression, yet it is only within the scope of this paper to assess a cross 
section of selected incidents on their own individual factors and the resulting 
implications these have on restricting freedom of expression.  
 
At indoor fascist political meetings, organised interruption prompted the ruthless 
responses of Mosley‟s Blackshirt stewards to violently beat and eject hecklers; the 
most famous demonstration of such Blackshirt brutality was at the 1934 Olympia 
meeting in London which attracted an audience of approximately 12,000. There were 
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also frequent confrontations between anti-fascists and the police. A common tactic of 
the anti-fascist groups was to hold rival protest meetings adjacent to fascist meetings 
which also often ended in violence. Anti-fascist disruption of BUF marches is 
highlighted by the Battle of Cable Street when 100,000 protesters took to the streets 
to block a provocative fascist march through Jewish communities in East London, 
and resulted in large confrontations between the police and anti-fascists. The priority 
of dealing with the extreme political movements from a public order perspective, 
rather than a potential threat to the democratic stability of the nation, was 
summarised by the Prime Minister Stanley Baldwin who alluded to the fascists and 
communists when introducing the Public Order Bill to Parliament by stating that they 
are „elements unimportant in themselves in this country but provocative of serious 
disorder.‟9 While the Public Order Act 1936 was primarily enacted to reduce the 
threat of disorder associated with political extremism, the contemporary uncertainty 
about the potentially dangerous growth of either the fascist or communist movements 
was also a concern of both the Home Office and the Metropolitan Police Force. By 
late 1936, BUF membership was on the incline, and although it did not reach the 
same level of support as it did in 1934, during the era in which the Blackshirts 
enjoyed the support of Lord Rothermere and his newspaper empire which included 
the Daily Mail, the increase in political activity, anti-Semitism and violence prompted 
enough official concern for legislative action. Metropolitan Police Commissioner Sir 
Philip Game highlighted the new trend of tactics and recruitment in a letter to the 
Secretary of State following the Battle of Cable Street which recommended new 
legislation emphasizing that the increased use of anti-Semitism was attracting new 
members to the BUF whilst simultaneously prompting many Jews to join communist 
groups. He believed that unless firm action was taken, there would be grave 
disorders in the future as both groups were growing and becoming increasingly 
violent.10  
 
Mosley‟s fascist creed, which was first associated with Italian fascist dictator 
Mussolini and then with Hitler and German Nazism, had generated a hostile 
response from groups of individuals which aimed to disrupt and discredit the BUF 
movement. The organised disruption highlighted an important contrast between the 
conflicting and competing freedoms of expression practised by the fascists and the 
anti-fascists, yet these freedoms were not protected by law.  
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2 Mosley’s Curious Claim to the ‘Right’ of Free Speech  
BUF propaganda frequently referred to the „established British right of free speech.‟11 
This terminology was used to justify the necessity of the Fascist Defence Force, yet 
in the 1930s, freedom of speech was not a legal „right‟. It only existed as an absolute 
„right‟ and privilege in Parliament guaranteed by the Bill of Rights 1689, which gave 
MPs unconditional freedom of expression. Outside of Parliament, freedoms were 
protected by the Common Law through the concept of residual freedom, whereby 
people were free to say what they liked except where the substantive law made it 
unlawful. Mosley‟s own interpretation of the concept of freedom of speech was 
formulated in an article published in Action in 1936. His article was a scathing attack 
on the „failing‟ democratic system that, instead of dealing with the assailants of free 
speech, the Government instead used the law against the defenders of free speech. 
Mosley recorded, „bricks were still whistling freely through the air, and round us, on 
the ground, were unconscious Blackshirts, savagely mauled by a highly organised 
Red mob because they had ventured to maintain an "Englishman's right of Free 
Speech" at their own meeting.‟12 Mosley‟s reference to free speech as an 
„Englishman‟s right‟ was an effective propaganda tool, used to justify the use of 
Blackshirt violence, and to discredit communism as an alien threat to English values. 
Mosley still referred to free speech as a „right‟ in his 1968 autobiography, My Life. He 
mentioned the organised minority who attempted to deny the right of free speech to 
the people and even claimed of his Blackshirts that, „These devoted young men 
saved free speech in Britain.‟13  
 
Countering Mosley‟s definition of freedom of speech, the Metropolitan Police 
Commissioner at the time, Lord Trenchard, stated that free speech did not mean that 
people could express their views without interruption from political opponents, but 
that people were free to air their views without official interference from the 
Government, or the police acting on their behalf.14 However, as free speech was not 
a legal right, protected by a constitution, the police did have the power at Common 
Law to prevent people from addressing a crowd if it was anticipated that the speech 
would be seditious or likely to result in a breach of the peace. In Justice of the Peace 
and Local Government Review, the concept of English „rights‟ was addressed in 
relation to public meetings in public places. It stated that such a right did not exist in 
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legal terms, but it existed as a „quasi-constitutional right‟ based on „practice of very 
long standing [that was] not lightly to be interfered with‟. The right to public meetings 
in public places was „only subject to the overriding right of His Majesty‟s subjects to 
move freely about the highways… and to the duty of the police to prevent breaches 
of the peace‟.15 This demonstrates that such freedoms had meaning and importance 
to the people and the state in principle, but as unwritten rights, they had no legal 
protection.  
 
3 A New Claim to the ‘Right’ of Free Speech?   
Following the Human Rights Act 1998, and the incorporation of the ECHR, certain 
rights have been given legal protection including Article 10, freedom of expression, 
and Article 11, freedom of assembly and association. But, can these liberties now be 
claimed as „rights‟, bearing in mind they are not absolute and can be restricted on 
such grounds as national security and public safety. In the 1930s, legislation already 
existed that curtailed freedom of speech. S54(13) Metropolitan Police Act 1839 made 
it an offence to „use any threatening, abusive, or insulting words or behaviour with 
intent to provoke a breach of the peace, or whereby a breach of the peace may be 
occasioned.‟ Similar powers were enforced in other regions by local by-laws. In the 
era of the BUF, s5 Public Order Act 1936 amended this law which gave this breach 
of the peace power uniformity throughout the United Kingdom.16 This establishes that 
English law has developed a tradition of restricting freedom of expression in order to 
preserve the peace. The POA 1936 has since been amended by the Public Order Act 
1986, in which it is not necessary to prove that any violence or threat of violence was 
present, which in effect criminalises pure speech.17 In addition, s4(1)b) also creates a 
new offence of displaying any writing, sign or other visible representation which is 
threatening, abusive or insulting. With such loosely defined legislation on the 
restrictions of freedom of speech, there is an inevitable risk that such wide 
discretionary powers will lead to inconsistent police action. 
 
In January 2010, Islam4UK revealed plans to march 500 coffins through Wootten 
Bassett to highlight the plight of Muslims in Afghanistan. The location of this 
proposed demonstration was particularly provocative as Wootten Bassett, a small 
market town near RAF Lyneham, has become synonymous with the repatriation of 
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British soldiers killed in action overseas since April 2007. By July 2009, over 70 
repatriation ceremonies had taken place in Wootton Bassett, with as many as 5,000 
people lining the streets and paying their respects.18 Islam4UK, which was headed by 
Anjem Choudary, was an offshoot of the radical Islamist movement al-Muhajiroun, a 
group that gained notoriety for referring to the 9/11 attackers as the „magnificent 19‟ 
and also glorified the Madrid train bombings in 2004. Then Prime Minister Gordon 
Brown condemned Islam4UK‟s proposed demonstration as „abhorrent and 
offensive‟.19 On 10 January 2010, Choudary announced that the march had been 
cancelled, but he had still gained extensive national publicity for his movement. Four 
days later, the Home Secretary made Islam4UK a proscribed organisation under the 
Terrorism Act 2000.  
 
Despite the fears centred on the BUF in the 1930s, the organisation was only 
proscribed as an emergency provision in July 1940 when it was considered that the 
members of the BUF could represent a Nazi-manipulated British „fifth-column‟.20 The 
state preferred to monitor and keep surveillance on the BUF rather than force the 
fascists to operate underground.21 The danger of banning extremist groups has since 
been highlighted again after the proscription of Islam4UK. Its former leader Choudary 
declared that the proscription of Islam4UK would „push young Muslims 
"underground" where they might turn to violence.‟22 He also used the ban to criticise 
the Government by stating that, „what the people will see is if you don't agree with the 
Government and you want to expose their foreign policy, then freedom quickly 
dissipates and turns into dictatorship.‟23 The proscription of Islam4UK demonstrates 
the scope of s3(5) Terrorism Act 2000 which authorises the Home Secretary to 
proscribe an organisation if it „commits or participates in acts of terrorism, prepares 
for, promotes or encourages terrorism or is otherwise concerned in terrorism‟.   
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The English Defence League (EDL), which was formed in March 2009, has also 
benefited from national media attention. They claim to be a peaceful, non-racist 
organisation that is only opposed to "militant Islam".24 However, EDL marches and 
protests have targeted areas with high Muslim populations, such as Luton, 
Birmingham and Leeds, and members have frequently provoked violence and 
disorderly confrontations with both the police and anti-fascist groups. Many protests 
have also involved incidents of racism and Islamophobia.25 Public order law has been 
invoked to check some of the EDL‟s proposed actions with a view to limit any 
anticipated damage. In August 2010, the Home Secretary, Teresa May, authorised a 
blanket ban on processions in the city of Bradford over the bank holiday weekend 
under s13 POA 1986 to prevent an EDL march. The march was planned for 28 
August 2010 and despite the ban, a static demonstration was still lawfully permitted 
and a reported 700 EDL activists took part in the protest near Bradford city centre. 
Following clashes with the police, 14 men were detained, two of which were charged 
with public order violations.  
 
Another controversy that challenged the modern right to freedom of expression 
occurred in Shropshire in 2002. British National Party member, Mark Norwood, was 
arrested and charged after he visibly displayed a poster in his window bearing the 
words, „Islam out of Britain‟. In his appeal Norwood claimed that he was entitled to 
display the poster and any conviction would infringe Article 10 of the ECHR. His 
appeal was dismissed partly due to his unreasonable behaviour in displaying the 
poster because the High Court took into consideration the proportionality of the 
conviction. Therefore his freedom of expression was curtailed in order to protect the 
public interest. Norwood v DPP26 demonstrates the limitations on the right to freedom 
of speech that have continued irrespective of the Human Rights Act 1998. It also 
reveals the vagueness of the public order legislation that confines it. S5 Public Order 
Act 1986 provides that,  
(1) a person is guilty of an offence if he (a) uses threatening, abusive or 
insulting words or behaviour, or disorderly behaviour, or (b) displays any 
writing, sign or other visible representation which is threatening, abusive or 
insulting, within the hearing or sight of a person likely to be caused 
harassment, alarm or distress thereby. 
 
In the case of Norwood v DPP, ss.28 and 31 Crime and Disorder Act 1998, which 
adds „racially or religiously aggravated‟ motivation to s5 of the 1986 Act, were also 
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applied to reject his appeal. Norwood‟s appeal claimed that free speech also 
included, „the irritating, contentious, eccentric, heretical, unwelcome and provocative, 
provided that it does not tend to provoke violence.‟27 However, the European Court of 
Human Rights ruled that the appellant could not enjoy the protection of Article 10 as 
his action had contradicted Article 17, the abuse of rights, in effect ruling that his 
application was inadmissible from the beginning. Article 17 is a provision that aims to 
„prevent individuals or groups with totalitarian aims from exploiting in their own 
interests the principles enunciated by the Convention.‟28  
 
The actions of Norwood, as well as those of the EDL and Islam4UK mentioned 
above, would all be regarded as offensive and provocative. All have been the subject 
of state interference and invoked legislation that has prohibited these actions. But 
has the offence and provocation caused warranted such restrictive actions? To what 
extent should the „right‟ to free speech be less constrained? Should we demonstrate 
vigilance as a community to ensure the controversial rights of others? Or, can 
preventative measures that prohibit the controversial opinions of others be justified 
from a human rights perspective as they aim to protect people from discrimination 
and maintain public order? In order to identify the progression of restrictions on 
freedom of expression that exist today, examples of police responses to the politically 
extreme movements of the 1930s can be analysed and compared to modern events. 
 
4 Anticipating a Breach of the Peace at Public Meetings 
The breach of the peace doctrine empowers the police to make an arrest without 
warrant when such a breach is committed in their presence or is reasonably 
anticipated. Under this ill-defined doctrine, the police have a duty to preserve the 
peace and are sanctioned with an arrest power which can be used when no 
substantive criminal offence has taken place. In the use of this power as preventative 
measure, the police must demonstrate to the court that their actions were justified in 
the facts as well as in theory. As the nature of the breach of the peace doctrine is 
broad and largely subjective, the discretion of the police officer and the interpretation 
of the judge do not necessarily harmonize. David Williams has scrutinized the basic 
foundation of the doctrine with the questions, “what, for instance, is a „breach of the 
peace‟, or what is meant by „in their presence‟, or what grounds are sufficient to 
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justify an arrest in anticipation of a breach?”29 The standard definition that is 
frequently referred to in case law today was composed by Watkins LJ in R v Howell30. 
We are emboldened to say that there is a breach of the peace whenever harm 
is actually done or is likely to be done to a person or in his presence to his 
property or a person is in fear of being so harmed through an assault, an 
affray, a riot, unlawful assembly or other disturbance. It is for this breach of the 
peace when done in his presence or the reasonable apprehension of it taking 
place that a constable, or anyone else, may arrest an offender without 
warrant.31 
 
In the 1930s, fascists and communists were both subject to police interference with 
regard to the speeches they made. Members of the BUF were known to be subject to 
police action for displays of anti-Semitism, while left-wing agitators had been 
intermittently prevented from addressing their audience by the police, usually under 
the anticipation that a breach of the peace or seditious speeches may occur. The 
authoritarian and preventative police tactics highlighted by Thomas v Sawkins32 and 
Duncan v Jones33 were also upheld by the judiciary which have subsequently 
strengthened the breach of the peace powers utilized by the police. Police action was 
also taken against left-wing or anti-fascist hecklers at the public meetings of the BUF. 
As noted above, legislation regarding offensive speech such as s54(13) Metropolitan 
Police Act 1839, and from 1 January 1937, s5 Public Order Act 1936, were loosely 
termed relying on police discretion which ultimately led to inconsistent police practice. 
A short examination of cases will highlight the underlying problems regarding police 
discretion and freedom of speech. 
 
Firstly, at fascist meetings there was the issue of fascist speakers making anti-
Semitic remarks that could either provoke or encourage violence and the freedom of 
audience members to heckle and show their contempt for fascism verbally. At an 
outdoor BUF meeting at the Plymouth Market in February 1934, the Western Morning 
News reported that the BUF area propaganda officer, Cann, was subject to „constant 
interruption, and many unpolite and unprintable remarks‟. The meeting was well 
attended by the police, and despite the disruption and the local newspaper‟s claim 
that the „hecklers became so persistent that a clash between the Socialist element 
and the Blackshirt guard which surrounded the lorry seemed imminent‟ the police did 
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not interfere with the verbal disturbance of the meeting.34 This is arguably an 
example of good police practice as although angry words were exchanged, physical 
hostility did not did materialise and order was kept. 
 
The exact nature of the heckling at the Plymouth meeting was not reported, and the 
reader is left to reflect on what the „unprintable remarks‟ in fact were. However, in 
The Times an incident at Leytonstone, Greater London, was reported in more detail. 
Joseph Bennett a bookshop manager shouted „Go back to Germany and eat German 
sausage‟ and „Fascism means hunger and war‟ at a BUF meeting. 35 In the opinion of 
the Metropolitan Police, this was likely to cause a breach of the peace and the 
heckler was arrested and marched to the police station. At Stratford Police Court, the 
defendant denied that he intended to break up the meeting but simply wished to 
express his disapproval of fascist principles, which he declared he was entitled to do. 
If it was found that his intention was to break up the meeting then he could have 
been fined a maximum of £5 or up to one month imprisonment under the Public 
Meetings Act 1908. Bennett was charged with using insulting words contrary to s54 
Metropolitan Police Act 1839 and was subsequently fined 40 shillings with an 
additional £2 and two shillings costs.  
 
The question that separates these two examples is, at what point should the police 
act to prevent a breach of the peace? The quote from Trenchard has already 
established that it was not the role of the police to protect speakers in public places 
from interruption that was caused by their political opponents. However, the police 
did have a duty to act when order was threatened or when threatening, abusive or 
insulting words or behaviour were used with the intent to provoke a breach of the 
peace or where a breach of the peace may be occasioned. The act of anticipating a 
breach of the peace is a highly discretional police power that can undoubtedly lead to 
the law being inconsistently applied. Even when political motivation is absent, crime 
prevention by its very nature relies, some what tentatively, on the uncertain and risky 
process of prediction and intervention, leaving the preventative nature of the breach 
of the peace doctrine to be extremely questionable. Gilling emphasizes that the path 
from prediction to intervention is filled by the „very human process of implementation‟, 
demonstrating that the two constituent elements of prevention create a „rough terrain‟ 
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that in practice the police ultimately traverse.36  This human element of prevention, 
and the differing actions applied by the police in similar scenarios, demonstrates the 
obvious difficulties of prediction and whether the correct mode of intervention was 
used, or was indeed effective. Within the objective of preserving public order, 
judgments on police intervention need to be addressed not only on the lines of 
whether order was preserved, but also whether individual or collective liberty was 
upheld. Balancing this difficult equation of order and liberty under the principle of 
discretion ultimately leads to inconsistency in police action and a loss of public 
confidence in the police.    
 
The conflicting police actions in the 1930s led to accusations that the police were 
politically motivated or demonstrated bias towards the fascists. Although the situation 
at the BUF meeting in Plymouth was highly flammable, and the police could have 
justified an action of dispersing the crowd or arresting hecklers under the anticipation 
that a breach of the peace may occur, the meeting ended without incident 
demonstrating that some meetings, despite hostile opposition, do not require direct 
police interference. The police tactics of monitoring and surveillance employed at 
Plymouth ensured that freedom of expression was maintained and the police 
presence, rather than police action, was enough to ensure that public safety was 
preserved. 
 
The arrest of Joseph Bennett for the comments made during the BUF meeting at 
Leytonstone was inconsistent in comparison to the Plymouth meeting and it also 
needs to be questioned whether police action was appropriate and proportionate. 
Bennett believed that he was „entitled‟ to demonstrate his disapproval of the 
speaker‟s principles.37 Although heckling was usually tolerated at outdoor meetings, 
police discretion was used to take action when it was anticipated that the words or 
actions of a heckler or public speaker were thought to result in a breach of the peace. 
These discretionary powers were even employed to prevent meetings from taking 
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5  Preventative Police Powers as Political Censorship?  
Katherine Duncan, a member of the National Unemployed Workers‟ Movement, 
attempted to hold a meeting outside a training centre in 1934. Inspector Jones 
requested that she moved her meeting, and, on refusing and continuing to speak she 
was arrested in order to prevent a reasonably anticipated breach of the peace which 
was an arrest power, but not an offence. She was then charged and convicted of 
obstructing a police officer in the execution of his duty which was an offence but did 
not have an arrest power attached at this time, demonstrating interplay of breach of 
the peace power and substantive criminal offence. This led to the appeal Duncan v 
Jones. For the appellant, Denis Pritt KC argued that it was not unlawful to hold a 
public meeting on the highway and that the police officer was not acting „in the 
execution of his duty‟ when he was obstructed by Mrs Duncan.38 He continued to 
argue that the appellant could not be found guilty of a legal act because of the 
apprehended illegal actions of others. He cited the authority of Beatty v Gilbanks39, in 
which the Divisional Court held that the Salvation Army‟s procession, whether 
intended to provoke a violent reaction from their rivals, the Skeleton Army, or not, did 
not actually break the law. It was held that the Salvation Army‟s assembly was lawful. 
Lord Hewart CJ dismissed the appeal and clarified that there was no „right‟ to public 
assembly, and it was „nothing more than a view taken by the Court of the individual 
liberty of the subject.‟40 He concluded that the policeman was acting within the 
execution of his duty and therefore the appellant did wilfully obstruct the respondent 
and dismissed the appeal. Pritt raised the issue in the Commons, stating that „it is 
extremely easy for the police to take repressive measures and find that often they are 
approved of by the courts.‟41 This outcome effectively criminalised a failure to comply 
with a police officer‟s instruction to desist from perfectly lawful conduct. 
 
In the year preceding this case, Hewart had also presided over Thomas v Sawkins. 
His controversial ruling in this case also upheld the right of the police to use 
preventative powers to avert a breach of the peace. Such tactics can be seen as 
ruthlessly authoritarian which restrict freedoms of expression. In this case the police 
entered a communist meeting held on private premises which the public were invited 
to. The holders of the meeting believed that they were entitled to refuse entry to the 
police, as they were the legal occupiers of the venue.  
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Police Inspector Parry, along with Sergeants Lawrence and Sawkins of the 
Glamorgan County Police, entered the meeting using Common Law powers, 
anticipating that the meeting could become an unlawful assembly, a riot, that a 
breach of the peace may occur or that seditious speeches were to be made. They 
refused to leave the premises after Alun Thomas, a speaker at the meeting, had 
lodged a complaint against the officers at the police station. When Thomas 
proceeded to exercise his believed right to eject the police and placed his hand on 
Parry‟s shoulder, Sergeant Sawkins intervened by pushing Thomas‟ arm and hand 
away and stated, „I won‟t allow you to interfere with my superior officer.‟42 Thomas 
brought a criminal prosecution against Sawkins under s42 of the Offences Against 
the Person Act 1861. It was agreed that neither Thomas nor Sawkins used more 
force than was reasonably necessary in the execution of their duty as steward or 
police officer, but if the prosecution could prove that Sawkins had no right to be in the 
hall at the time of the incident, his actions would have constituted assault.  
 
Lord Chief Justice Hewart asserted that „a police officer has ex virtute officii full right 
so to act when he has reasonable ground for believing that an offence is imminent or 
is likely to be committed‟ and dismissed the appeal.43 The persuading argument 
came from Vaughan Williams KC for the respondent who reasoned that the police by 
oath swear to keep the peace and, by their duty of preventive justice, have a right to 
enter private premises to prevent a breach of the peace.44  
 
The reasonable anticipation of a breach of the peace was echoed by Lord Hewart 
who confirmed that it was part of the „preventive power, and, therefore, part of the 
preventive duty, of the police… to enter and remain on the premises.‟45 Such a strong 
emphasis on the preventive power of the police has deep implications for civil 
liberties. This measure does in fact open the discretionary power of the police to act 
under the apprehension of an offence being committed and effectively punishes the 
person that the police are acting against without them even committing an offence. 
Justice Avory stated the authority of the police most clearly confirming that „no 
express statutory authority is necessary where the police have reasonable grounds 
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to apprehend a breach of the peace‟.46 This effectively provided the police with the 
power to enter public meetings on private premises when a breach of the peace was 
anticipated, setting a new precedent. 
 
Following the controversial outcome of Thomas v Sawkins, Thomas Kidd of the 
National Council for Civil Liberties (NCCL) reflected on its potential effect stating, 
„Judge-made law, as binding as parliamentary law, could undermine democracy.‟47 
Despite the emphasis on the preventive duty of the police to anticipate breaches of 
the peace, Duncan v Jones and Thomas v Sawkins demonstrate the potential for 
police to act as political censors and be supported by the judiciary.  
 
6  Modern Police Tactics, Counter-Terrorism Legislation and the 
Human Rights Act 1998 
Recent police action has also placed a strong significance on preventative tactics. 
However, since the Human Rights Act 1998, and the adoption of the ECHR, 
fundamental rights are now protected by law. This adds a new dimension to the 
accountability of the police with reference to their discretional powers such as 
anticipating a breach of the peace. Indeed, the authority of Duncan v Jones has since 
been mitigated by the ruling of Sedley LJ in Redmond-Bate v DPP48. Like Duncan, 
Redmond-Bate also involved an arrest for the wilful obstruction of a police officer in 
the execution of his duty, who was acting to preserve the peace. Ms Redmond-Bate 
was one of three Christian fundamentalists who were preaching on the steps of 
Wakefield Cathedral, while a crowd of about 100 people gathered, some of which 
were hostile to the speakers. The critical question of where the threat to public order 
came from, being either the speakers or the hostile elements of the crowd, was the 
decisive issue. It was judged that the police should direct their powers to those 
responsible for a breach or anticipated breach of the peace, which in this case should 
have been those in the crowd that were unreasonably reacting to the religious 
speakers. Despite much of the HRA 1998 not being in full force at this time, Sedley 
LJ referred to it in his judgment, stating that in the interregnum, Common Law and 
executive action should seek compatibility with the ECHR or risk „putting the United 
Kingdom in breach of the Convention and rendering it liable to proceedings before 
                                                          
46
 [1935] 2KB 257. 
47
 S. Scaffardi, Fire Under the Carpet: Working for Civil Liberties in the 1930s (Lawrence and 
Wishart Limited, 1986) p.78 
48
 Redmond-Bate v DPP [2000] HRLR 249. 





the European Court of Human Rights.‟49 Articles 9 and 10, freedom of thought, 
conscience and religion and freedom of expression respectively, were mentioned in 
the judgment in defence of the appellant, which contrasted the view held by Lord 
Hewart CJ mentioned above that such rights are, „nothing more than a view taken by 
the court of the individual liberty of the subject.‟50 He also recognised that there was, 
and had been for a long time, good reason in policing and law to respect the 
Convention rights, marking a subtle constitutional shift that was cemented by the 
HRA 1998. 
 
Paradoxically, despite the capacity for human rights to now have legal protection, a 
sequence of counter-terrorism legislation has been enacted which has further 
damaged civil liberties and individual freedoms. The Terrorism Act 2000 widened the 
definition of terrorism and made further powers available for the proscription of 
organisations that were believed to be involved with terrorism. Since the terror 
attacks on New York and Washington on 11 September 2001, the Anti-Terrorism, 
Crime and Security Act 2001 and the Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005 have made 
provisions for terror suspects to be submitted to pre-charge detention and control 
orders respectively. More legislation followed the terror attacks in London on 7 July 
2005 which included the Terrorism Act 2006, Identity Cards Act 2006 and the 
Counter Terrorism Act 2008. 
 
Amongst the implications of these further Acts, was the continued assault on freedom 
of expression which came in ss. 1(3) and 2(4) Terrorism Act 2006 as it created an 
offence to glorify the commission or preparation of terrorism under both the 
encouragement of terrorism and dissemination of terrorist publications. Liberty 
challenged Clause 2 of the Draft Bill, stating that it criminalised opinions, which was a 
measure that should not be tolerated in a democracy as it was both „repressive and 
counter productive.‟51 Ewing criticised the scope of s2 and highlighted the concerns 
of academics and librarians whose courses may concern terrorism or international 
relations.52 Hunt also expressed concern regarding the Acts potentially „chilling effect‟ 
on speech as it could reasonably be expected that broadcasters, Internet Service 
Providers and other organisations and individuals may consequently practice self-
censorship. However, Hunt accurately anticipated that the creation of new terrorism 
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related offences of publication and dissemination, under ss.1 and 2 of the 2006 Act, 
would not „precipitate a rush of criminal prosecutions and/or convictions‟ due to the 
uncertainty of outcome faced by prosecutors relating to publications where the nature 
of the „encouragement‟ element is ambiguous.53  
 
The most significant prosecutions under s2 are that of Abdul Rahman and Bibal 
Mohammed. In November 2007, Rahman was the first the first person to be 
convicted of disseminating terrorist information under the Terrorism Act 2006 whilst 
also pleading guilty to two other charges. The s2 charge related to a letter found in 
Rahman‟s bedroom from a school friend, Awan Aslam. The letter referenced Al-
Qaeda fighters killed in action, Aslam‟s experiences in fighting (although the details 
of where and against whom are not clear) and outlined the military need of 
assistance to combat air power, with instructions to disseminate the information to six 
named people. In March 2008 at Leeds Crown Court, s2 was used independently for 
the first time to convict Mohammed of disseminating terrorist material. This related to 
DVDs he sold on stalls around the country which glorified the terror attacks of 9/11. 
In the judgment of James Stewart QC the material was designed to „induce young 
British Muslims to be recruited to the terrorist cause‟.54 Rahman and Mohammed both 
succeeded in having their sentences reduced following an appeal in 2008.55  
 
Public order and counter-terrorism legislation has significantly corroded the liberties 
of freedom of expression and assembly on individuals attending protests and 
demonstrations. This is most notably highlighted by R (o/a Laporte) v Chief 
Constable of Gloucestershire.56 In 2003, the police stopped and searched three 
coaches travelling to RAF Fairford to participate in an anti-war demonstration. The 
Gloucestershire Police used s.60 Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994 to stop 
and search those attending. They then used Common Law powers of breach of the 
peace to send the coaches back home, denying the passengers to exercise their 
right to protest. The House of Lords held that the stop and search was legal but that 
the police had exercised breach of the peace powers too early as the threat to public 
order posed by the passengers was not imminent. The police decision to deny the 
coach travellers their right to protest was especially disproportionate considering that 
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there was a police presence at Fairford which was organised to manage 10,000 
people, and the police search had only identified eight passengers who were 
members of the radical group known as the Wombles. 
 
Counter-Terrorism laws have also been controversially used in non-terror related 
incidents. The controversial s.44 Terrorism Act 2000 entitles police to perform a stop 
and search on a member of the public without „reasonable suspicion‟ in areas 
authorised by the police and the Home Secretary. Gillan and Quinton, a student 
protester and a journalist, were both subjected to a stop and search whilst on their 
way to a protest outside an arms fair at the Excel conference centre, London, in 
2003. Under the belief that the stop and search was a breach of their human rights, 
they took their case to appeal. The appellants argued that the stop and search 
violated Article 5 of the ECHR, the right to liberty and security. The Court of Appeal, 
confirmed by the House of Lords, held that a brief search could not be regarded as a 
„deprivation of liberty‟.57 However, in 2010, the European Court of Human Rights 
unanimously found that the stop and search was not in accordance with the law for 
the purposes of Article 8(2) as it did not respect their right to private life.58 This 
confirmed that the statutory power was so vague and imprecise that it afforded 
extremely wide discretionary power to the police. The Coalition Government have 
addressed this authoritarian and oppressive power by introducing c.58 Protection of 
Freedoms Bill which repeals s.44 of the Terrorism Act 2000.  
 
Although Gillan and Quinton‟s application was finally upheld on the basis that the 
stop and search did not respect their right to a private life, the police tactics employed 
have further implications on freedom of expression. As both appellants were 
proceeding to a protest outside an arms fair, the indiscriminate stop and search 
powers employed meant that protesters with peaceful intentions were subjected to 
intrusive and humiliating searches: a potentially degrading or frightening experience 
that may prevent further participation in public protests or demonstrations by the 
individual or an observer. Concern over police tactics that could potentially, and 
undemocratically, discourage people practising their right to protest was addressed 
by the Human Rights Joint Committee in 2009. Their Seventh Report acknowledged 
criticism from protestors and human rights groups that „techniques such as penning 
in protestors and attempting to collect names and addresses… could have the effect 
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of intimidating and deterring protest.‟59 The Committee recommended that greater 
clarity was needed in respect to police powers and there was a need to „draft 
legislation itself in sufficiently precise terms so as to constrain and guide police 
discretion‟.60 An important suggestion that aimed to remove unnecessary discretion 
was to amend s.5 Public Order Act 1986. The Committee advocated that language 
that was „insulting‟ should not be criminalised, as this could be used inappropriately 
by the police to restrict freedom of speech.61 This amendment would continue to 
protect people from abusive and threatening words or behaviour. The nature of the 
suggested changes emphasised the need for effective dialogue between the police 
and the protestors that would help establish a trusting relationship between them that 
could quickly counteract any conflict. It was also highlighted that the police, at all 
levels, should receive regular, relevant and up to date training that would enable 
them to adopt a human rights approach to policing protest.62  
 
Since these recommendations the Metropolitan Police have received further criticism 
for allegedly disproportionate tactics that they employed during the student tuition 
fees protests in November and December 2010. The police tactics employed during 
these protests are especially illuminating as the protestors are not extremists with a 
radicalised or provocative agenda and they are not a potential threat to national 
security. Small minorities among the protestors caused public disorder and the 
stringent and indiscriminate response of the Metropolitan Police intensified the 
friction between them. Following the violence at the demonstration on 10 November 
2010, the Metropolitan Police Commissioner Sir Paul Stevenson argued that „The 
game has changed‟, using this tough rhetoric to defend the large use of riot police at 
the protest on 24 November.63 Incidents of unduly aggressive policing and the use of 
truncheons were widely reported in the media64 which has led to fears that 
aggressive policing is a tactic purposefully employed to deter the participation in 
public protests. This has been raised in letters to the national press as well as by left 
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wing organisations. In the Guardian, Mike Hames wrote, „It is evident to me that the 
intimidation and violence used against the students were designed not only to deter 
students, but also the massive protests expected against other cuts.‟65 An article in 
Socialist Action criticised the Conservative led coalition government for their tough 
pro-police response which they claimed would, „de-legitimise protest and deter 
participation in future demonstrations through fear of violence from the police.‟66 
 
The most serious complaints about police tactics have centred on the use of 
„kettling‟. This is a tactic used to contain protestors in police cordons for long periods 
of time to prevent potentially volatile situations arising. The „kettle‟ is indiscriminate 
and often leaves peaceful protesters imprisoned without food or toilet facilities for 
long periods at a time. Following the controversial use of this tactic by the 
Metropolitan Police at the May Day demonstrations in 2001 and the G20 protests in 
2009, „kettling‟ has already been subject to the scrutiny of the UK courts in Austin v 
Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis67 and Moos v Commissioner of Police of 
the Metropolis68 respectively.  
 
Louis Austin had been held within a police cordon with approximately 3,000 other 
protestors for around seven hours in cold and uncomfortable conditions. This 
preventative police tactic was utilized to avert a potential breach of the peace 
following unexpected numbers of demonstrators arriving at Oxford Circus as the 
organisers deliberately did not give notice to the police. Austin challenged the 
Metropolitan Police‟s use of this tactic in the context of Article 5(1) of the ECHR 
claiming a deprivation of liberty. Both the Court of Appeal and the House of Lords 
held that Article 5(1) was not engaged. In the leading judgment Lord Hope stated that 
such tactics of crowd control should not fall within the ambit of Article 5(1) as long as 
they are proportionate and are not enforced for longer than necessary.69 These 
judgments have received notable criticism from Helen Fenwick and David Mead. 
 
Fenwick criticised the outcome of Austin affirming that it has „aided in opening the 
door to police policies of suppression and intervention in protest, coming close to 
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political censorship‟70 and advocated that a review of the breach of the peace 
doctrine is overdue. By comparing Austin with Laporte, Fenwick argues that these 
varying judgments demonstrate the imprecision of the breach of the peace doctrine 
and advocates its abolition in accordance with proposals of the Organisation for 
Security and Co-operation in Europe and the 2009 Joint Committee on Human 
Rights.71 Mead attacked the subsequent police use of „kettling‟ following Austin, 
arguing that what underpinned the decision was that a cordon is only lawful where it 
is the only possible solution to a potentially dangerous and volatile situation. 
Regarding the seemingly calculated use of this tactic by the Metropolitan Police at 
the G20 protests in April 2009, Mead probed the understanding of the police, stating 
that there was nothing in the speeches made in the House that authorised „kettling‟ 
as a „legitimate, premeditated tactic rather than as a spontaneous response.‟72 
Indeed, following Moos, his deliberation has proven to be accurate. If the use of a 
police cordon is planned in advance of a protest, rather than as a response to 
disorder, or potentially imminent disorder, then the question of when police 
intervention of this kind is lawful or not must be found in the principle of immediacy 
determined in Laporte. The utilizing of the breach of the peace doctrine in this way 
must always be subject to proportionality and necessity. This is certainly present in 
the judgment of Moos. Despite the risk of violent protestors joining Camp Climate, 
the peaceful protest at Bishopsgate in which Joshua Moos was present, May J ruled 
that at the time of the containment it was „only a risk; and it was not… a risk of 
imminent breaches of the peace sufficient to justify full containment‟.73 The claimants 
therefore succeeded in establishing that the containment of the Camp Climate 
protest in the first instance, as well as the police pushing operation that moved the 
protest between 20 and 30 meters from their position in which shields and batons 
were violently used to achieve this, were not lawful. Although the Metropolitan Police 
have issued their intention to appeal this decision, Moos has established that the 
principle of immediacy that was applied in Laporte, is also applicable to the police 
tactic of „kettling‟. This reasserts that the Common Law power or duty of the police to 
take preventative action has a threshold requirement of imminence and that any 
action taken must be reasonable and proportionate. These requirements will also be 
fundamental to subsequent legal action arising from the student protests during 
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November and December in 2010. A further dimension that has been highlighted by 
Emma Norton, the legal officer at Liberty, is that the use of the police cordon does 
not „distinguish between the law-abiding majority and the handful intent on 
violence.‟74 This is a key element to this particular situation when considering that 
many of the contained protestors were school children. 
 
It is also essential to examine the tactic of „kettling‟ within the context of policing the 
demonstrations of extremist groups such as the EDL. As with the demonstration in 
Bradford mentioned above, Theresa May also issued a ban on all processions in 
Leicester to take effect on 9 October 2010 following the EDL‟s application to 
demonstrate in the city. This was issued amid fears that the EDL were planning to 
attack Mosques in the area increasing the likelihood of serious public disorder. This 
meant that the EDL could only demonstrate by way of static protest, albeit within the 
protection, or confinement, of heavy police lines. On the same day, a counter protest 
by Unite Against Fascism (UAF) was also taking place and the objective of the police 
was to keep the two groups apart. However, the containment of the EDL within a 
police cordon to prevent them from causing disorder failed as a large group broke 
free from the static demonstration causing damage to property and having skirmishes 
with the local youth. In its report of the policing of the demonstration, the Network for 
Police Monitoring (Netpol) emphasized that the EDL had broken through police 
cordons before and this was anticipated by the local community.75 The benefit of 
banning processions was also questioned by Netpol as this led to a shuttle bus 
service being provided to transport EDL members from their prearranged meeting 
point to the rally site. Incidentally, the meeting point was an area in which three pubs 
were in the vicinity and the provision of alcohol was facilitated for the EDL 
protestors.76 Following their transportation to the rally site, there were confrontations 
with the police „who deployed riot shields and batons along with dogs and horses.‟77 
A contrast in public order tactics can be drawn with the EDL rally at Luton on 5 
February 2011 in which a procession ban was not sought and the police facilitated a 
one mile march for both the EDL and UAF. Although the march hindered local 
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business and shops were boarded up, the protests caused relatively little violent 
disorder.78 
 
The policing operation in Luton was less autocratic and restrictive than that applied at 
Leicester and could be heralded a success due to the fewer incidents of violence. Yet 
the authorisation of a ban on processions, enforcing a static EDL demonstration 
behind police lines, was not the only preventative tactic that restricted freedom of 
expression that was applied ahead of the Leicester demonstration. More 
controversially, the police had blatantly attempted to deter local people from 
attending the protests. This was done by „distraction techniques‟ in which provision 
was made to local youth clubs and community centres to provide activities which 
aimed to keep young people away from the city centre. Children were also warned 
that under s46 Children Act 1989 the police would have the power to take any young 
person into police protection who were at risk of „significant harm‟ due to lack of 
parental care. As this is a provision that aims to keep children safe from exploitation 
and abuse, Netpol reported that this was the first time they were aware of it being 
used in the context of political protest.79 Further controversial police tactics which 
were aimed at deterring protest, was the manor in which the „stay at home‟ message 
was largely targeted at the Muslim community. This kind of interference which was 
aimed at one section of the community is disproportionate and appears politically 
motivated as it is a duty of the police to facilitate public protest and such tactics of 
persuasion cannot be justified as necessary to prevent public disorder.80 
 
Since the introduction of the Human Rights Act 1998, it has been established that the 
various police tactics employed at protests and demonstrations have frequently 
violated human rights law. These have ranged from the inappropriate use of counter-
terrorism legislation, with regard to the s44 stop and search powers, and the 
excessive use of breach of the peace powers, which prevented the coach 
passengers from proceeding on their way to a legitimate anti-war protest. In these 
instances, Human Rights Law has defended the rights of the protester and can be 
seen as a tool that will potentially counter unjust laws and disproportionate police 
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tactics. Following the controversial police tactics employed at the student protests, 
the Metropolitan Police have been advised by the Independent Police Complaints 
Commission to review the use of kettling as a crowd control tactic.81 Lawyers are also 
currently planning a legal challenge against the Metropolitan Police for their use of 
this tactic on 9 December 2010 at Trafalgar Square, and they will argue that the five 
hour detention violated Articles 5, 10 and 11 of the ECHR.82 In this case, where 
police action has curtailed freedom of expression, it was not because of the 
protestors‟ message being threatening, abusive or insulting, but because of the 
anticipated disorder that would potentially have been caused by a minority of those 
involved. When the use of indiscriminate tactics obstructs the legitimate right to 
protest, the discretionary power of the police becomes undermined, their actions 
challenged, and they can potentially be found to have acted unlawfully.   
 
 
Conclusion: Have the Rules of the Game Changed? 
The protection of rights under the Human Rights Act 1998, now offers a greater 
potential to challenge controversial and aggressive police tactics on the grounds that 
they violate the freedoms and liberties now protected by the ECHR. However, it has 
been witnessed in Norwood v UK that freedoms of expression are not absolute. A 
person‟s claim to the protection of their rights will subsequently become invalid if they 
have been deemed to have abused the rights of others. The more controversial 
claims to the rights to freedom of expression, such as any made by Islam4UK, the 
EDL or BNP members, will therefore be unlikely to find compatibility or support from 
the ECHR.  
 
The comparison between the two eras, has demonstrated that English Law in the 
past century, has always stopped short of defending any absolute claim to free 
speech, as guaranteed in the First Amendment of the US Constitution.83 The 
preservation of public order has been a consistent priority in the drafting of new 
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legislation and in High Court decisions which has been to the detriment of civil 
liberties. During the drafting of the Public Order Act 1936, concern about the effect of 
new legislation on the liberty of the people was considered, but it was deemed that 
the greater good was to protect the security of the public. The necessity of the Act 
was summarised by Labour MP Ernest Thurtle, „to sacrifice in some minor degree 
some of the liberties we have hitherto enjoyed, I think the gain we shall get from the 
Bill will more than compensate us for those sacrifices.‟84 The Marquess of Reading 
later stated that, „we prefer to look upon this Bill less as restricting liberty than as 
repressing abuses of liberty.‟85  
 
In the period that has followed the terror attacks on London in 2005, the principle of 
defending rights and liberties has remained unchanged. However, the tragic death of 
the 52 victims has changed the level of fear and insecurity associated with modern 
terrorism and the severity of the rhetoric used by politicians and public figures. 
Following the attacks, Tony Blair famously declared, „Let no one be in any doubt that 
the rules of the game are changing‟ and suggested that amendments would be made 
to the Human Rights Act if necessary to enable the deportation of extremist clerics.86 
While in opposition, David Cameron raised the rhetoric of fear associated with the 
new terror threat by stating, „Every man, woman and child is a target for terrorists 
who are actively plotting indiscriminate slaughter on a massive scale.‟87 His speech 
underlined that the law courts „seem to bend over backwards to accommodate terror 
suspects‟ and advocated that a new Bill of Rights would replace the Human Rights 
Act. Cameron then stated that „a future Conservative government will not hesitate to 
take whatever measures are necessary to protect British citizens from harm.‟88  
 
The comparison of state responses to extremist movements in the 1930s and to the 
modern threat of terrorism reveal that the conflict faced between prioritising either 
individual liberty or collective security is consistent in both eras, and in this case, the 
rules of the game have not changed. The arguments against unnecessary measures 
that were raised in the 1930s against the Public Order Act and Common Law 
judgments remain relevant today. The broad breach of the peace powers that 
incorporate the wide use of police discretion, which have been growing since the 
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1930s, allow for inconsistency in police tactics and can produce further restrictions on 
liberty, especially freedom of expression and assembly.  
 
This comparison demonstrates that there is a constant need for laws to be 
proportionate to the risk they deem to counteract so that they do not destabilise our 
democratic principles. While such fundamental rights and freedoms are now more 
readily protected by virtue of the Human Rights Act 1998, our domestic courts have 
manifestly failed in this regard. Ultimately  it was the European Court of Human 
Rights that finally declared the use of s.44 to be a violation of Article 8 offering at 
least some optimism that the UK courts should take note of such reasoning to 
challenge the use of autocratic police discretion and oppressive law. The failure to 
extend or protect the right of freedom of expression to Norwood, the EDL and 
Islam4UK, reveal that the legal establishment has tended to continue  its historic 
 tradition of limiting the use of free speech to radical or extremist individuals and 
groups on that basis of the vague all encompassing  notion of the breach of the 
peace. In 1936, before such rights had legal protection, Labour MP Andrew 
MacLaren warned that to curtail liberty to preserve democracy is to say that you are 
„willing to kill democracy in order to save it‟,89 and that principle is still relevant today 
in assessing how proportionate the current anti-terror legislation is in striking an 
appropriate balance between collective security and individual liberty.  
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